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CLIMATE CHANGE AND PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW:
AEP V. CONNECTICUT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR STATE COMMON LAW ACTIONS
JEFFREY N. STEDMAN*
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2010, the Democratic leadership in Congress
gave up on its attempt to pass legislation aimed at curbing carbon emis-
sions associated with climate change.1 This failure was a major disap-
pointment to conservation groups and activists who had spent months
negotiating and promoting the proposed legislation.2 It was even seen “as
a setback by some utility executives who had hoped that Congress would
set predictable rules governing” greenhouse gas emissions.3
In recent years, some plaintiffs have begun to appeal to common
law public nuisance doctrine in an attempt to address problems associ-
ated with climate change, with an assortment of government entities and
private landowners suing energy companies and automakers for certain
* J.D. expected May, 2012, William & Mar Law School; B.A. in philosophy, University of
Memphis; M.A. and Ph.D. in philosophy, University of California, San Diego. The author
would like to thank the editorial board and staff of the William & Mary Environmental
Law and Policy Review for their assistance in the development of this Note. Special thanks
to Julia Stolar, Lauren Coleman, and Justin Mahramas. The author also thanks his wife
Nancy and son Adam for their continued love and support.
1 Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill Effort, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/us/politics/23cong.html.
2 Id.; see also Press Release, Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Audubon Leader Comments on Senate
Failure to Address Climate Change (July 22, 2010), available at http://www.audubon.org
/newsroom/press-releases/2010/audubon-leader-comments-senate-failure-address-climate
-change-0; Joe Romm, The Failed Presidency of Barack Obama, Part I, THINK PROGRESS
(July 22, 2010), http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2010/07/22/206465/the-failed-presidency
-of-barack-obama/; Gus Speth & Andrea Cone, Congressional Failure to Enact Climate
Change Legislation, VT. L. TOP 10 ENVTL. WATCH LIST, http://watchlist.vermontlaw.edu
/congressional-failure-to-enact-climate-change-legislation/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (listing
the “Congressional failure to enact climate change legislation” as the top environmental
issue of 2010).
3 Hulse & Herszenhorn, supra note 1; see Tina Casey, Big Utilities Weigh In on New Climate
Change Bill, the American Power Act, CLEAN TECHNICA (May 12, 2010), http://cleantechnica
.com/2010/05/12/big-utilities-weigh-in-on-new-climate-change-bill-the-american-power-act/.
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effects of climate change.4 This trend has been welcomed by conservation
groups and resisted by utility and other energy companies.5 Indeed, a pri-
mary complaint made by defendant utility companies in such cases is that
the application of public nuisance doctrine to the issue of climate change
would require courts to address these questions through the application
of “vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts,” thereby making it dif-
ficult for potential defendants to reliably predict what sorts of activities
will give rise to liability.6
A number of commentators have warned of the dire consequences
of allowing greenhouse gas emissions policy to be governed by the appli-
cation of common law public nuisance doctrine. For example, one free
market–oriented blogger warned of a “tsunami of global warming liti-
gation hitting with hurricane force.”7 Swiss Re, a major international
reinsurance company, identified climate change litigation in the United
States as a serious, emerging threat to insurance companies, suggesting
that it could be the “new asbestos.”8
4 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527
(2011); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted,
598 F.3d 208, appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010); Native Vill. of Kivalina
v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), appeal filed, No. 09-17490
(9th Cir.); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
5 Indeed, conservation groups have been directly involved in suing major power com-
panies for their greenhouse emissions under public nuisance doctrine. For example, in
Connecticut v. AEP the plaintiffs included the Audubon Society of New Hampshire, the
Open Space Institute, and the Open Space Conservancy, while the defendants were all
major power companies. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 266–67
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
6 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, 20, Am. Elec. Power Co. v.
Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010) (No. 10-174), 2010 WL 3054374 at *20 [hereinafter
Brief for Petitioner] (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304,
317 (1981)).
7 Don C. Brunell, Tsunami of Global Warming Litigation Hitting With Hurricane Force,
OLYMPIA BUS. WATCH (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.olympiabusinesswatch.com/2009
/11/tsunami-of-global-warming-litigation-hitting-with-hurricane-force.html; see Global
Warming: Here Come the Lawyers, BUS. WEEK (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.businessweek
.com/magazine/content/06_44/b4007044.htm; Peter Lattman, Global Warming & the Law,
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2006, 8:15 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/10/24/global
-warming-the-law/.
8 Daniel Hays, Climate Claims Are the ‘New Asbestos,’ Swiss Re Suggests, PROP. CASUALTY
360 (May 29, 2009), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2009/05/29/climate-claims-are
-the-new-asbestos-swiss-re-suggests.
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Reaction from the legal academy has been more favorable, with
one scholar suggesting that the application of public nuisance doctrine
could offer the functional equivalent of a carbon tax, which is regarded
by many economists as the most economically rational response to cli-
mate change.9 On this view, public nuisance litigation offers an alter-
native path to what some consider the most rational policy choice, when
powerful political interests make it impossible to achieve this policy
through the legislative process.10
Two recent decisions by United States Courts of Appeals served
to fuel the hopes and fears surrounding climate change litigation. Both
the Fifth Circuit and the Second Circuit issued decisions allowing public
nuisance climate change cases to go forward, in both cases reversing dis-
trict court decisions which had dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims as non-
justiciable political questions.11 In Comer v. Murphy Oil, the Fifth Circuit
would eventually reinstate the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’
complaint on purely procedural grounds,12 but, to the extent that the Fifth
Circuit ruled on the merits of the case, it sided with the plaintiffs, at least
on the issue of whether plaintiffs had a legitimate cause of action.13
Proponents of public nuisance climate change litigation won a more
substantial victory, however, when the Second Circuit, in Connecticut
v. AEP, reversed the district court’s dismissal of a public nuisance cli-
mate change case, holding that the case did not present the court with
a non-justiciable political question.14 The plaintiffs petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for certiorari, as did the Obama Administration’s
Solicitor General, representing the co-defendant Tennessee Valley
9 Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate
Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827, 1829 (2008). Interestingly, Michigan Congressman Fred
Upton sees proposed Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulations in the wake
of recent climate change litigation as a “backdoor attempt” to implement a cap-and-
trade system. Matthew L. Wald, E.P.A. Says It Will Press On With Greenhouse Gas
Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/24/science/earth
/24epa.html?hpw.
10 See Martha Judy & Jonathan Gerard, Climate Change in the Courts, VT. L. TOP 10
ENVTL. WATCH LIST, http://watchlist.vermontlaw.edu/climate-change-in-the-courts/ (last
visited Apr. 2, 2012) (“Judicial review may be the best option to address global warming
in light of legislative and executive inaction to curb human-induced climate change.”).
11 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 319 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2527 (2011); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009), opinion va-
cated pending reh’g en banc, 589 F.3d 208, appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
12 See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
13 Comer, 585 F.3d at 879–80.
14 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 392.
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Authority (“TVA”).15 The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ petition
for certiorari in December 2010.16 In June 2011, the Court issued its
decision, holding that any claim against the defendants based on federal
common law was displaced by the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).17
The Court’s reversal of the Second Circuit’s Connecticut v. AEP
decision will likely be a source of dismay among conservation groups and
rejoicing among large-scale greenhouse gas emitters. However, such re-
sponses would be premature. Although the Court made it clear that any
claim against the defendants based on federal common law would be dis-
placed by the CAA and pending Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
regulations, the Court also explicitly left open the question of whether
plaintiffs such as those in AEP v. Connecticut might have a claim against
greenhouse gas emitters under state common law.18 In short, while the
Court settled the issue of displacement of federal common law by federal
statutory and regulatory law, it did not resolve the issue of preemption
of state statutory and common law.19
Although the Court’s holding in AEP v. Connecticut was clear, the
Court’s opinion was relatively short20 and did not offer as complete a
description of the Court’s reasoning as one might expect. For instance,
while the Supreme Court drew the same conclusion as the district court
in AEP v. Connecticut, it eschewed the district court’s analysis in terms
of the political question doctrine, instead relying on a displacement
argument.21 But the Court did not give any clear indication as to why it
rejected the district court’s approach. This is somewhat surprising given
that all of the district courts to hear climate change public nuisance
cases dismissed the complaints by relying on the political question doc-
trine, holding that such cases presented the courts with non-justiciable
political questions.22
15 Brief for the Tenn. Valley Auth. in Support of Petitioners at 8–9, 25–30, Am. Elec.
Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010) (No.10-174), 2010 WL 3337661 (Aug. 24,
2010) [hereinafter Solicitor General’s Brief].
16 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010) (noting the grant of certiorari).
17 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011).
18 Id. at 2540 (highlighting that the parities briefed the Court on state law nuisance claims).
19 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
20 While the Second Circuit’s decision in AEP ran almost ninety pages, the Supreme
Court’s opinion is approximately fourteen pages. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582
F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
21 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537.
22 See infra notes 31–59 and accompanying text.
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This Note has two primary objectives: (1) to explain why the
Supreme Court in AEP ruled the way it did, specifically, why it relied on
a displacement analysis instead of the political question doctrine favored
by the lower courts; and (2) to consider the extent to which the Court’s
decision in AEP leaves open the possibility of public nuisance claims
against AEP-type defendants under state common law.
This Note argues that the Court’s preferring a displacement anal-
ysis over reliance on the political question doctrine is not, in the end,
terribly surprising, given the harsh criticism23 that doctrine has attracted
in recent years, in both its classical formulation and in the “prudential”
form proposed by the Solicitor General.24 If anything is surprising, it is
the district courts’ reliance on the political question doctrine, given its
controversial status.
This Note also argues that, while there is explicit language in the
CAA that seems to preserve to the states the right to impose more strin-
gent emission standards on large-scale greenhouse gas emitters, there
are reasons to doubt that such an approach would be successful, either as
a legal strategy or as a means of mitigating the effects of climate change.25
Although the Court withheld judgment on the preemption issue due to its
not being sufficiently briefed,26 there is language in the Court’s AEP opin-
ion suggesting that the Court would find preemption of state law by the
CAA.27 Moreover, even if the Court did not find preemption of state com-
mon law, any plaintiff in a state law action would be severely restricted by
the state court’s inability to regulate out-of-state greenhouse gas emitters.28
Thus, although the Supreme Court’s decision in AEP gives some
hope to those who would address the problem of climate change through
state common law public nuisance litigation, it would be a mistake to ex-
pect such an approach to play a significant role in addressing the various
problems associated with climate change. Similarly, it would be a mis-
take to see the decision as a harbinger for a “tsunami of global warming
litigation” or as an alternative path to the carbon tax promised land.
23 See infra notes 267–70 and accompanying text.
24 See Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 11–22 (arguing that plaintiffs’ objections
to defendants’ standing are best understood as grounded in prudential considerations,
instead of the standing requirements of Article III of the Constitution).
25 See infra Part III.F.
26 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
27 See infra notes 236–42 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 230–33 and accompanying text.
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This Note is organized as follows. Part I describes the effects of
climate change pointed to by plaintiffs in these cases and the treatment
of these claims by various federal courts. Part II describes the concept of
federal common law and explains how a public nuisance climate change
case could arise under it. Part III explains why the Supreme Court in
AEP v. Connecticut held federal common law public nuisance claims to
be preempted by the CAA and considers the extent to which the Court’s
analysis leaves open the possibility of a public nuisance claim under
state common law. Part IV considers the political question doctrine, ex-
plaining why the Supreme Court chose not to rely on this doctrine, in spite
of its popularity with federal district courts faced with climate change
public nuisance cases.
I. THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE RESPONSE OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS
In order to appreciate what is at stake in the climate change
debate, one must have some idea of the possible effects of climate change.
Although there are pockets of skepticism about climate change, or the
role of human activity in bringing it about,29 there nevertheless seems to
be a broad, substantial scientific consensus that carbon dioxide emission
from human activity is a significant cause of climate change.30 This sec-
tion describes the types of damages plaintiffs have claimed in climate
29 See John M. Broder, Bashing E.P.A. Is New Theme in G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/us/politics/18epa.html (describing skepticism
about climate change as part of current Republican Party orthodoxy).
30 For a helpful discussion of the science behind climate change, see Daniel Grossman,
Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2–3 nn.1–4, 9–11 nn.28–38 (2003). On the issue of the scientific consensus
regarding climate change, see Zasloff, supra note 9, at 1858–59 nn. 160–62. See also
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS AND TECHNICAL SUMMARY
7, available at http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRREN_SPM.pdf (finding that “green-
house gas (“GHG”) emissions resulting from the provision of energy services has con-
tributed significantly” to a dramatic increase in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentra-
tions since 1850, and that “[m]ost of the observed increase in global average temperature
since the mid-20th Century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic
greenhouse gas concentrations”). For an authoritative discussion of the role of climate
change in increasing the incidence of extreme weather events, see U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE
SCIENCE PROGRAM, WEATHER AND CLIMATE EXTREMES IN A CHANGING CLIMATE: REGIONS
OF FOCUS: NORTH AMERICA, HAWAII, CARIBBEAN, AND U.S. PACIFIC ISLANDS passim (2008),
available at http://downloads.climatescience.gov/sap/sap3-3/sap3-3-final-all.pdf (describing
the effect of greenhouse gases on extreme weather events).
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change nuisance suits and briefly describes how various federal courts
have responded.
There are four prominent climate change public nuisance cases
that have made their way into the federal courts.31 In California v. General
Motors32 the State of California sued six large automobile manufacturers,
claiming that emissions from automobiles they manufactured contributed
to climate change, which in turn has caused the snow pack in California’s
mountains to melt earlier in the season and more rapidly than it did in
years past.33 Southern California in particular, with its arid climate, his-
torically has depended heavily on the mountainous snow pack for its wa-
ter supply,34 and earlier melting of the snow puts this water supply in
jeopardy.35 Moreover, the higher temperatures cause the snow pack to
melt more quickly, which increases the likelihood of flooding.36 The State
of California sued the automakers for creating a nuisance through their
contribution to global warming, seeking monetary damages as compen-
sation for the millions of dollars the state spent to study, plan for, monitor,
and respond to current and potential effects of global warming.37
California put forth both federal and state common law nuisance
claims.38 The district court dismissed the federal public nuisance claim
on non-justiciability grounds, holding that deciding the case would re-
quire that the court make inappropriate policy determinations where
there was a “lack of judicially discoverable or manageable standards”
available to resolve the question before it.39 In essence, the court held
that public nuisance doctrine provided it with no legal standard by which
it could rationally determine whether the activities of the defendants
31 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 8–10 (noting three of the four cases, with the
fourth being the case at issue in the brief).
32 California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007), appeal dismissed, No. 07-16908 (9th Cir. June 24, 2009).
33 Id. at *1–2.
34 See CITY OF L.A. DEP’T OF WATER & POWER, SECURING L.A.’S WATER SUPPLY, 1, 6 (2008),
available at http://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/cms/ladwp010587.pdf.
35 The California v. General Motors court noted that the Sierra Nevada snow pack accounts
for thirty-five percent of the state’s entire water supply. California, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1.
36 Id.; see USGS Multi-Hazards Demonstration Project, Arkstorm: West Coast Storm
Scenario, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., http://urbanearth.gps.caltech.edu/winter-storm-2/ (last
visited Apr. 2, 2012) (warning of the possibility of catastrophic “mega-storms,” intensified
by climate change, causing massive urban and agricultural flooding and other losses in
California).
37 California, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1–2.
38 Id. at *2.
39 Id. at *5–16.
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were so unreasonable as to constitute a public nuisance.40 The court re-
frained from passing judgment on the state common law nuisance claim,
on the grounds that the dismissal of the federal diversity claim left it
without supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim.41
In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil42 the governing body
of an Inupiat tribal village along the western coast of Alaska sued twenty-
four oil, energy, and utility companies, seeking compensatory damages
for costs associated with relocation of their village.43 The village, with a
population of about 400, claimed that rising temperatures had caused the
melting of sea ice along the coast, which had protected the village from the
effect of winter storms, and that the resulting erosion was so severe that
the village would have to be moved.44 Like California in its case against
the automakers, the village claimed that global warming was a public nui-
sance and sought damages against the defendants for their contribution
to this nuisance.45 Like the court in California v. General Motors, the court
in Kivalina dismissed the suit, holding that the claims presented non-
justiciable political questions.46 The Kivalina court additionally held that
the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not trace their injuries
to any of the named defendants’ emissions.47
In Comer v. Murphy Oil a group of Mississippi residents and prop-
erty owners sued a number of oil, coal, chemical, and utility companies
in a class action for damages associated with Hurricane Katrina.48 The
plaintiffs claimed that the rising temperatures associated with climate
change had “fueled and intensified” the hurricane, and that since the
defendants had contributed to climate change, they should be held re-
sponsible for the effects of Katrina, including plaintiffs’ damages.49 The
district court in Comer dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim as presenting non-
justiciable political questions and for lack of standing.50
40 Id. at *15–16.
41 Id. at *16.
42 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
43 Id. at 868.
44 Id. at 868–69.
45 Id. at 868.
46 Id. at 883.
47 Id. at 880–81. In AEP v. Connecticut, the Court reported a four-to-four split on the
question of Article III standing, with Justice Sotomayor taking no part in the decision,
thus leaving undisturbed the Second Circuit’s finding of standing. 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535,
2540 (2011).
48 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009).
49 Id. at 859.
50 Id. at 860.
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However, on appeal the plaintiffs in Comer won an initial major
victory when a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court, holding that the case did not present a non-
justiciable political question and that the plaintiffs did have standing, so
that the plaintiffs’ case could go forward.51 But the victory was short-
lived. The Fifth Circuit granted an en banc rehearing,52 but after a re-
cusal left the court without a quorum, it dismissed the appeal, vacating
the decision of the three-judge panel and leaving in place the district
court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ case.53
It was in Connecticut v. AEP where those favoring the use of the
public nuisance doctrine to address the problem of climate change won
their first substantial victory.54 The plaintiffs consisted of the States of
Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wisconsin and the City of New York, along with the Open
Space Institute, Inc., the Open Space Conservancy, Inc., and the Audubon
Society of New Hampshire.55 The defendants were a number of major
power companies, including the American Electric Power Company, the
Southern Company, and the Tennessee Valley Authority.56 The plaintiffs
identified the defendants as the five biggest carbon dioxide emitters in
the United States, claiming that their emissions “constitute approxi-
mately one quarter of the U.S. electric power sector’s carbon dioxide
emissions” and that “U.S. electric power plants [were] responsible for ten
percent of worldwide carbon dioxide emissions from human activities.”57
The plaintiffs in the AEP case followed the by-now familiar pat-
tern of claiming that the defendants, in contributing to climate change,
had given rise to a public nuisance. But whereas the plaintiffs in the
other public nuisance cases had sought compensatory damages, here the
plaintiffs sought an injunction against the defendants, asking the court
to impose a cap on the defendants’ carbon emissions.58 The district court
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, holding that the case presented the court
with non-justiciable political questions.59 However, in a very lengthy and
wide-ranging opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
51 Id. at 879–80.
52 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2010).
53 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 2010).
54 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
55 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 265, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 268 (citations omitted).
58 Id. at 272.
59 Id. at 274.
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district court, holding that the case did not present non-justiciable po-
litical questions, that the federal common law nuisance action claimed
by the plaintiff had not been displaced60 by the CAA, and that the plain-
tiffs had standing to sue under the public nuisance claim.61
II. FEDERAL COMMON LAW
In Erie v. Tompkins the Supreme Court made it clear that “[t]here
is no federal general common law.”62 But this just means that, in exercis-
ing its diversity jurisdiction in a typical common law cause of action such
as breach of contract or negligence, a federal court is not at liberty to
draw its own conclusions about what the governing substantive law ought
to be.63 Instead, the court must apply the relevant state common law.64
However, on the same day65 that Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie was
announced, the Court also announced another Brandeis-authored opinion
explicitly affirming the authority and power of the federal courts to cre-
ate federal common law, at least in certain circumstances.66 The circum-
stances at issue in this latter case involved interstate water rights, an
area which has played a prominent role in the development of federal
common law since the Court’s Erie decision.67
Although federal common law is alive and well (in spite of Justice
Brandeis’s statement in Erie) and is perhaps even expanding,68 the
Supreme Court has never offered a clear definition or theory of federal
60 The courts have been somewhat inconsistent in their usage of terminology, with some
courts describing federal statutory law as “displacing” federal common law. See, e.g.,
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 392 (2d Cir. 2009). Other courts
describe federal statutory law as “preempting” federal common law. See, e.g., City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981). The Supreme Court, in
its AEP v. Connecticut decision, used “displacement” in relation to federal common law
and “preemption” in relation to state law, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2530, 2534 (2011), and this
Note follows that usage.
61 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 315, 319.
62 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
63 See id. at 71–73. The Erie decision overturned Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), in
accord with which many federal courts pursued the project of establishing a common,
national commercial law.
64 Erie, 304 U.S. at 73.
65 Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 585, 597 (2006).
66 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
67 Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 65, at 596–97.
68 Id. at 586.
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common law.69 However, in the early 1980s the Court offered some help-
ful guidance in determining its nature and scope. In Texas Industries v.
Radcliff the Court, after citing Erie’s statement that there is no federal
general common law, identified two instances under which federal com-
mon law is available: (1) “those in which a federal rule of decision is ‘neces-
sary to protect uniquely federal interests’”; and (2) “those in which Congress
has given the courts the power to develop substantive law.”70 Since it is
clear that Congress has not expressly given the federal courts the power
to develop substantive law in the area of greenhouse gas emissions, the de-
velopment and application of federal common law for public nuisance cli-
mate change cases would have to be grounded in the protection of uniquely
federal interests. The Texas Industries Court emphasized that these in-
stances will be “few and restricted” and it described the areas in which
federal common law is appropriate as “limited.”71 As the Court put it,
absent some congressional authorization to formulate sub-
stantive rules of decision, federal common law exists only
in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights
and obligations of the United States, interstate and interna-
tional disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States
or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.72
A second case in which the Supreme Court offered valuable guid-
ance in the development and application of federal common law, particu-
larly in the context of climate change litigation, is City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois,73 commonly known as Milwaukee II.74 The Court decided this case
nine years after its decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,75 commonly
known as Milwaukee I.76 In Milwaukee I the State of Illinois asked the
Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and abate an alleged nui-
sance created by the City of Milwaukee when it discharged large amounts
69 Id. at 589.
70 Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quoting Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)).
71 Id. (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).
72 Id. at 641; see also Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 65, at 594–609 (discussing four en-
claves of federal common law: cases affecting rights and obligations of the United States;
interstate controversies; international relations; and admiralty).
73 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
74 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 326 (2d Cir. 2009).
75 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
76 See, e.g., Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 327.
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of raw and inadequately treated sewage into Lake Michigan, an inter-
state waterway that borders Illinois.77
The Court identified a number of federal laws “touching interstate
waters,”78 but found that none of them provided a remedy to Illinois.79
The Court held that, in this case, it was only federal common law that
offered a remedy to Illinois, stating that “[w]hen we deal with air and water
in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law.”80
Thus, the Court in Milwaukee I held that the State of Illinois did have a
federal common law nuisance claim against the City of Milwaukee, and
exercised its discretion in remitting the parties to the appropriate district
court for further proceedings.81
After the Court’s decision in Milwaukee I, the plaintiff filed suit
in federal district court, which found that Illinois had established the ex-
istence of a nuisance under federal common law, and ordered the defen-
dant City of Milwaukee to eliminate overflows of raw sewage and achieve
specific limitations on the discharge of treated sewage.82 The City of
Milwaukee appealed, and in what has come to be known as Milwaukee
II, the Supreme Court held that because of Congress’s passage of the
Clean Water Act in the years subsequent to its decision in Milwaukee I,
the plaintiff State of Illinois no longer had a claim under federal common
law.83 While affirming the Milwaukee I Court’s holding that a remedy for
public nuisance is sometimes available under federal common law, the
Court held that the State of Illinois’s public nuisance claim had been
displaced84 by the subsequent passage of the Clean Water Act.85
The Court’s holding in Milwaukee II with respect to displacement
is an important one, and will be considered in more detail in Part III. The
focus here, however, is on what the Court’s opinion reveals about the na-
ture and scope of federal common law. Citing Erie, the Court declared that,
unlike state courts, federal courts are not general common law courts and
lack the power and authority to develop their own “rules of decision.”86
77 Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 93.
78 Id. at 101–03.
79 Id. at 103.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 108.
82 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 311 (1981).
83 Id. at 307, 317–23, 332.
84 The Milwaukee II court uses the term “preempted.” See supra note 60.
85 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316–17.
86 Id. at 312.
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The language used in Justice Rehnquist’s opinion suggests that
there is a presumption against federal common law, and that courts should
resort to it only in very limited circumstances: “When Congress has not
spoken to a particular issue . . . and when there exists a ‘significant con-
flict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law’ the
Court has found it necessary, in a ‘few and restricted instances’ to develop
federal common law.”87 The Court described federal common law as a “nec-
essary expedient” and as something that “is resorted to ‘[in] absence of
an applicable Act of Congress.’”88 The Milwaukee II opinion also empha-
sized the gap-filling role of federal common law, rejecting its application
when existing federal statutory and regulatory law leave no “interstice”
to be filled by federal common law.89
Another limitation of federal common law has to do with its re-
lation to state common law claims. In many of the climate change public
nuisance cases, the plaintiffs have made their claims under both federal
and state common law.90 So long as this is just a case of lawyers keeping
their options open by arguing in the alternative, this is not problematic.
However, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the two claims are,
in principle, incompatible. In Milwaukee II the Court noted,
the inconsistency in Illinois’ argument and the decision of
the District Court that both federal and state nuisance law
apply to this case. If state law can be applied, there is no
need for federal common law; if federal common law ex-
ists, it is because state law cannot be used.91
Similarly, the Second Circuit’s opinion in Connecticut v. AEP, citing
Milwaukee II, refused to consider the plaintiffs’ alternative state law
87 Id. at 313 (citations omitted).
88 Id. at 314 (citations omitted).
89 Id. at 323–24; see Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 330 (2d Cir. 2009);
Coop. Benefit Adm’rs, Inc. v. Ogden, 367 F.3d 323, 329–30 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that
federal common law may be used as a minor gap filler).
90 See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869 (N.D. Cal.
2009); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). In Comer v. Murphy Oil, the plaintiffs asserted claims under Mississippi
common law, and made their way into federal court via diversity jurisdiction. 585 F.3d
855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009).
91 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 313 n.7.
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claims on the grounds that they were incompatible with the court’s find-
ing that plaintiffs had a valid cause of action under federal common law.92
Given the rather limited role played by federal common law in our
legal system,93 it is not surprising that federal courts would refuse to ap-
ply federal common law if there is an adequate remedy available under
state common law. Part III argues that there is strong support for the
Supreme Court’s recent holding that existing, or soon-to-be existing, leg-
islative and regulatory law displaces the type of common law public nui-
sance claims exemplified by Connecticut v. AEP. However, this does not
necessarily mean the end of such claims, because the absence of federal
common law in this area, even through displacement by Congressional
and EPA action, could still leave room for state common law to operate.
III. PREEMPTION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
A. Early 20th-Century Federal Common Law and the Public
Nuisance of Water Pollution
Although federal common law has been applied in a fairly wide
range of cases,94 it has been especially prominent in cases involving in-
terstate water pollution.95 In a 1906 case, Missouri v. Illinois,96 it was
Illinois (specifically, the City of Chicago) that was dumping raw sewage
into Lake Michigan, and this sewage was allegedly making its way down
the Mississippi River toward St. Louis.97 After several hundred people in
St. Louis died of diseases such as typhoid,98 the State of Missouri sued
Illinois, seeking an abatement of a public nuisance.99
At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was virtually
no federal legislation regarding water pollution.100 Thus, there were no
92 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 392.
93 See supra notes 70–72, 82–89 and accompanying text.
94 See Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 65, at 594 (noting six different areas of federal
common law).
95 Id. at 596–99.
96 Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri II), 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 523.
99 Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri I), 180 U.S. 208, 216 (1901). This earlier decision es-
tablishing a federal cause of action is often distinguished from the Court’s 1906 decision
by referring to the 1901 decision as Missouri I and the 1906 case as Missouri II. See, e.g.,
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 326 (2d Cir. 2009).
100 Milwaukee I points to some very limited legislation passed in 1899, under which
Congress established “some surveillance by the Army Corps of Engineers over industrial
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legislative interstices for the federal courts to fill. However, there was a
federal interest at stake, and the Supreme Court held that the State of
Missouri could sue Illinois under federal common law.101 Although the
injunction was eventually denied on the factual finding that the bacte-
ria from Chicago could not survive the trip down the river to St. Louis,102
the case nevertheless established a federal common law cause of action
for one state against another state whose activities constituted a pub-
lic nuisance.103
The next year, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, the Court held that
the State of Georgia had a federal common law cause of action against two
copper smelters in Tennessee, whose facilities were emitting sulphur diox-
ide which made its way across the state border into Georgia, causing dam-
age to the (mainly agricultural) property of certain citizens of Georgia.104
In this case, the causation of damages was established to the satisfaction
of the Court, and the injunction was granted.105
B. The Renewal of Federal Common Law Public Nuisance Claims
in the 1970s
By the time that Milwaukee I made its way to the Supreme Court
in 1972, Congress had passed a significant amount of legislation regard-
ing water pollution, including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
originally passed in 1948, and the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969.106 Nevertheless, the Court found that existing legislation did not
offer the plaintiff the needed remedy, and appealed to federal common
law in fashioning a remedy for Illinois.107
The Court emphasized, however, that the federal common law of
nuisance could eventually be displaced by new federal legislation or reg-
ulations: “But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered
to appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance
by water pollution.”108 Enforcement of the environmental rights of a state
against impairment from a source outside its borders, at least at the time
pollution, not including sewage.” Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91,
101 (1972).
101 Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 208–09, 248.
102 Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 525–26.
103 Id. at 517–18; Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 208.
104 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238–39 (1907).
105 Id.
106 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 101–02 (1972).
107 Id. at 103.
108 Id. at 107.
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of Milwaukee I, required the application of federal common law: “Until
the field has been made the subject of comprehensive legislation or au-
thorized administrative standards, only a federal common law basis can
provide an adequate means for dealing with” Illinois’s claim.109
When the Illinois-Milwaukee dispute finally made its way back
to the Supreme Court in 1980, the Milwaukee II Court held that subse-
quent federal legislation regarding water pollution—specifically, what has
come to be known as the Clean Water Act110—was sufficiently compre-
hensive to displace any appeal to federal common law. Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion saw this legislation as a product of Congress’s recognition that
the previous federal water pollution control program was “inadequate in
every vital aspect.”111 The new amendments to the Act established a new
regulation regime which made it illegal for anyone to discharge pollut-
ants into interstate waters unless they had a permit.112 Once a suitably
comprehensive statutory and regulatory system governing water pollu-
tion was in place, the question simply became whether the actions of the
City of Milwaukee were in accord with or in violation of the new statu-
tory and regulatory regime.113 At this point, the common law nuisance
cause of action had dissolved.
The Court in Milwaukee II justified its position on displacement
of federal common law by appeal to separation of powers, saying that
once Congress has addressed a problem, federal courts cannot continue to
appeal to their own judgment about what is most in accord with common
sense and the public interest.114 The question of whether the legislation
at issue had displaced federal common law required “an assessment of the
scope of the legislation and whether the scheme established by Congress
addresses the problem formerly governed by federal common law.”115 Once
Congress had spoken directly on an issue, the federal courts were no
longer free to substitute their own substantive judgment under the
guise of “supplementing” Congress’s answer or filling legislative and
regulatory interstices.116
109 Id. at 107 n.9.
110 The Court referred explicitly to the “Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972.” City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 307 (1981).
111 Id. at 310 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 7 (1971)).
112 Id. at 310–11.
113 See id. at 311.
114 Id. at 315.
115 Id. at 315 n.8.
116 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981); see id. at 324
n.18 (distinguishing cases where the district court, in imposing stricter limitations, was
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For the Milwaukee II Court, the question of whether the amended
water pollution control legislation spoke directly to the case at issue
depended on whether the legislation was sufficiently comprehensive—
whether Congress had “occupied the field through the establishment of
a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert adminis-
trative agency.”117 Justice Rehnquist’s opinion delved into the legislative
history and found that the purpose of the amendments was not just to
add another bit of legislation about water pollution, but was instead a
complete rewriting and total restructuring of existing water pollution
law.118 The opinion also relied on frequent usage of the word “comprehen-
sive” in the legislative history, finding that “[n]o Congressman’s remarks
on the legislation were complete without reference to the ‘comprehensive’
nature of the Amendments.”119
C. Application of Federal Common Law Public Nuisance Doctrine
to Air Quality
The Second Circuit’s decision in Connecticut v. AEP closely fol-
lowed the analysis laid out in the Milwaukee cases. The court examined the
relevant statutory and regulatory law for the climate change context—in
this case, the CAA—and found that it was not sufficiently comprehensive
to displace the plaintiffs’ public nuisance action.120 Although the Supreme
Court has recently defined carbon dioxide as a pollutant for purposes of
the CAA, and made clear that the EPA has the authority to regulate its
emission with respect to its impact on climate change,121 the EPA had, at
the time of the Second Circuit’s decision, not yet issued any regulations
on carbon emissions from stationary sources such as coal-fired power
plants.122 Therefore, the AEP case was distinguishable from Milwaukee
II, and it is not surprising that the Second Circuit refused to find dis-
placement by Congressional action in this case.
(in the opinion of the Milwaukee II Court) actually providing a different regulatory
scheme than that developed by Congress, as opposed to merely filling a gap in the
regulatory scheme).
117 Id. at 317.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 318.
120 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 375–88 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing
the court’s displacement analysis).
121 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–30 (2007).
122 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 379–81.
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However, by the time the Supreme Court heard the defendants’
appeal from the Second Circuit’s decision in AEP, there had been signifi-
cant changes in the EPA’s treatment of greenhouse gases. Before the
Second Circuit’s decision, the most that Congress and the EPA had done
was call for consideration and study of the problem of climate change and
the role of greenhouse gases, and there had been no actual regulation of
greenhouse gases aimed at preventing or mitigating the effects of climate
change.123 But as the Solicitor General’s brief in support of the defendants’
petition for certiorari explained, by the time AEP reached the Supreme
Court, there had been significant movement by the EPA toward a more
comprehensive regulation of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide.124
The Solicitor General’s brief pointed to several developments occur-
ring since the Second Circuit’s issuing of its AEP decision on September 21,
2009, that undermined the Second Circuit’s conclusion regarding displace-
ment.125 Many of these developments were in response to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.126 The first development oc-
curred on October 30, 2009, when the EPA issued a rule requiring cer-
tain sources (typically those that annually emit more than 25,000 tons
of greenhouse gases per year) to report emissions of greenhouse gases
to the EPA.127 Second, on December 15, 2009 the EPA found that green-
house gases “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
and welfare,” and determined “that carbon-dioxide and other greenhouse-
gas emissions from new motor vehicles contribute to total greenhouse-gas
air pollution.”128
The third development pointed to by the Solicitor General is more
complicated than the first two.129 On May 7, 2010, the EPA, in conjunc-
tion with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “published
a joint final rule,” aimed at “dramatically reduc[ing] greenhouse-gas
123 See id. at 381, 386 (“We express no opinion at this time as to whether the actual
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under the CAA by EPA, if and when such
regulation should come to pass, would displace Plaintiffs’ cause of action under the
federal common law.”).
124 Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 8–9, 25–30.
125 Id. at 22–32.
126 549 U.S. 497; see Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 377–79.
127 Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 25.
128 Id.; see Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under
Section 202(a) of the CAA, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,497 (Dec. 15, 2009). The Second Circuit’s AEP
decision emphasized that the EPA had not, at the time of its decision, made any findings
about the effect of greenhouse gases on public health and welfare. 582 F.3d at 379.
129 Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 25–27.
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emissions from light-duty vehicles.”130 The new restrictions on emissions
from these vehicles were scheduled to go into effect on January 2, 2011,
and the Solicitor General argued that these new regulations would have
significant implications for stationary emitters of greenhouse gases.131 For
the first time, greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide would be treated
as “pollutants” under the CAA, and Sections 165 and 169(1)132 of the CAA
would now apply to stationary sources of greenhouse gases.133 The effect
of this, argued the Solicitor General, would be that “any new or modified
‘major emitting facility’” would have to get a PSD (“prevention of signif-
icant deterioration”)134 permit, which would require the facility to be
“subject to the best available control technology for each pollutant subject
to regulation under [the CAA.]”135
The Solicitor General also argued that the adoption of the new
light-duty vehicle rules subjected greenhouse gases to the permitting re-
quirements of Title V of the CAA.136 The Solicitor General’s brief137 pointed
to a 2005 decision of the D.C. Circuit Court, which stated that the CAA’s
Title V permitting process “requires that certain air pollution sources,
including every major stationary source of air pollution, each obtain a
single, comprehensive operating permit to assure compliance with all
emission limitations and other substantive CAA requirements that apply
to the source.”138 Thus, the classification of carbon dioxide as a pollutant
under the CAA, which was required by the Supreme Court’s holding in
Massachusetts v. EPA, seemed to require any major stationary source of
carbon dioxide to obtain a Title V permit.139 Accordingly, on June 3, 2010,
130 Id. at 25.
131 Id. at 26.
132 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a), 7479(1) (2006).
133 Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 27–29.
134 “A PSD permit is a legal document that limits the amount of air pollution that may be
released by a source (i.e., a plant or facility). A PSD permit is required before a ‘major’ new
source is constructed, or before changes or modifications that are ‘major’ or ‘significant’ are
made at an existing ‘major’ source of air pollution. The permit may be issued by EPA or
the designated permitting authority. The permit specifies what construction is allowed,
what emission limits must be met, and often how the equipment that is causing the air
pollution must be operated.” Air Permits, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region9
/air/permit/psd-public-part.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
135 Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 26–27 (alteration in original) (quoting 42
U.S.C. §7475(a)(4)).
136 Id. at 27.
137 Id.
138 Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 993 (2005) (emphasis added).
139 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007).
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the EPA issued a final rule that tailored application of the PSD and Title
V permitting requirements to stationary emitters of carbon dioxide.140
The Solicitor General’s arguments for displacement were submit-
ted to the Supreme Court in August 2010, and were subsequently bol-
stered by a December 2010 EPA press release outlining the agency’s plan
for implementing greenhouse gas standards for fossil-fuel power plants
and petroleum refineries, which the EPA described as “two of the largest
industrial sources [of greenhouse gases or GHG], representing nearly 40
percent of the GHG pollution in the United States.”141 The EPA promised
to issue regulations with regard to greenhouse emissions from stationary
sources (presumably in addition to the PSD and Title V permitting require-
ments discussed by the Solicitor General) within the next two years.142
The EPA’s press release stated that it would propose standards
for power plants in July 2011 and for refineries in December 2011, and
that it would issue final standards for power plants in May 2012 and for
refineries in November 2012.143 In conjunction with the developments
described by the Solicitor General, any new standards developed by the
EPA for greenhouse gas-emitting power plants and refineries would have
given the Supreme Court substantial grounds for finding the respon-
dents’ federal common law public nuisance claim displaced by federal
statutory and regulatory law.
The EPA’s December 2010 press release was somewhat vague,
and it left open the possibility that its new greenhouse gas regulations
would amount to nothing more than a permit system.144 Although a permit
140 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (referring more generally to permitting for greenhouse
gas emissions). See Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 27 n.17 for a description
of various steps of the tailoring rule for carbon dioxide emitters.
141 Press Release, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA to Set Modest Pace for Greenhouse Gas
Standards (Dec. 23, 2010) [hereinafter EPA Press Release], available at http://yosemite
.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/d2f038e9daed78de852
5780200568bec!OpenDocument.
142 The EPA described plans to develop New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”),
which “set the level of pollution new facilities may emit and address air pollution from
existing facilities.” Id. The EPA’s plans for regulation of existing stationary sources of green-
house gases, as described in the December 2010 press release, were somewhat vague, which
might have been expected to create trouble for those who wished to describe the regulatory
scheme as “comprehensive.” Id. But the Supreme Court made clear that it was the CAA,
and not subsequent EPA regulations, that preempted federal common law. Am. Elec.
Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011). See also infra note 311.
143 EPA Press Release, supra note 141.
144 See id. (noting a general discussion of “standards”).
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might not sound like a comprehensive regulation of the problem of cli-
mate change, it would offer strong support for the conclusion that Congress,
through an administrative agency’s (i.e., the EPA’s) interpretation of the
CAA and a gap-filling regulation, had spoken directly to the issue of the
legality of the activities of the defendants in AEP, and that any federal
common law public nuisance claim had therefore been displaced.145
In both its PSD and Title V permitting scheme146 and its promise to
issue future regulations with respect to greenhouse gases,147 the EPA has
taken an incremental approach to climate change regulations. However,
as the Solicitor General noted, the Supreme Court allows Congress and
administrative agencies such as the EPA “significant latitude as to the
manner, timing, content, and coordination of its regulations.”148 About
an incremental approach, the Supreme Court has said the following:
“Agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems
in one fell regulatory swoop. . . . They instead whittle away at them over
time, refining their preferred approach as circumstances change and as
they develop a more nuanced understanding of how best to proceed.”149
Climate change is a serious and complex issue, with respect to both sci-
ence and public policy. It thus seems just the sort of issue on which the
relevant administrative agencies would take a slow and incremental
approach, and such an approach to the problem seems sufficiently com-
prehensive to justify the Supreme Court in finding displacement of fed-
eral common law in this area.150
Thus, given the changes in the EPA’s position regarding the reg-
ulation of greenhouse gases after the Second Circuit’s AEP decision, one
might have predicted that the Second Circuit would find itself in a po-
sition analogous to that of the Court in Milwaukee I, where the Court’s
upholding of a federal common law cause of action was later undermined
145 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 310–11 (1981) (high-
lighting a comparable permitting system within the Clean Water Act).
146 Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 27 n.17.
147 The EPA press release emphasizes that it is setting a “modest pace” and taking a
“common-sense approach” to the regulation of greenhouse gases. EPA Press Release,
supra note 141.
148 Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 28 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497, 524 (2007)).
149 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524.
150 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (“[Legislative] reform
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind.”).
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by the passage of the Clean Water Act.151 A reasonable view before the
Supreme Court’s decision in AEP might have been that, although the
Second Circuit was correct about the displacement issue at the time of
its decision, the movement of the EPA in the time between that decision
and the appeal before the Supreme Court made it almost certain that the
Supreme Court would find the plaintiffs’ federal common law claim dis-
placed by the CAA, combined with new EPA regulations.
D. The Supreme Court’s Analysis in AEP v. Connecticut
The Supreme Court did find displacement of the plaintiffs’ feder-
al common law claim, but the Court made it clear that the EPA’s regula-
tory initiatives after the Second Circuit’s decision were not necessary
to reach such a conclusion.152 The Court noted that, at the time of the
Second Circuit’s decision, the “EPA had not yet promulgated any rule reg-
ulating greenhouse gases.”153 The Court also noted several of the most im-
portant recent EPA regulatory actions with respect to greenhouse gases,
including the phasing in of requirements that mandated new or modified
major greenhouse gas emitting facilities use the “best available control
technology,” and the EPA’s commencement of a rule-making action under
Section 111 of the CAA “to set limits on greenhouse gas emissions from
new, modified, and existing fossil-fuel fired power plants.”154 The Court also
noted the EPA’s plan to introduce a proposed rule on greenhouse gas emis-
sions from stationary sources by July 2011, and a final rule by May 2012.155
The Second Circuit had accepted the plaintiffs’ argument “that
federal common law [was] not displaced until the EPA actually exer-
cis[ed] its regulatory authority, i.e., until it set[ ] standards governing
emissions from the defendants’ plants.”156 The Solicitor General’s descrip-
tion of the EPA’s regulatory actions after the Second Circuit’s decision
was designed to demonstrate that the EPA had in fact exercised its
regulatory authority, and thus, that a finding of displacement was now
151 See generally City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 310–11 (1981)
(finding displacement of federal common law in light of subsequent “comprehensive”
legislation).
152 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011).
153 Id. at 2535.
154 Id. at 2533 (citing 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4) (2006)).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 2538.
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appropriate.157 But the Court made it clear that any appeal to EPA reg-
ulatory actions was unnecessary to find displacement:
The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the
decision whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emis-
sions from power plants; the delegation is what displaces
federal common law. Indeed, were EPA to decline to regu-
late carbon-dioxide emissions altogether at the conclusion
of its ongoing § 7411 rulemaking, the federal courts would
have no warrant to employ the federal common law of nui-
sance to upset the agency’s expert determination.158
Thus, while the Solicitor General’s arguments for displacement on the
basis of the actions of the EPA subsequent to the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion may have been persuasive, they were, in the end, of mere academic
interest. The CAA is sufficient, in and of itself, to displace any federal com-
mon law public nuisance claim the plaintiffs in AEP might have had.
A comparison of the Supreme Court’s decision in AEP with its de-
cision in Milwaukee II is instructive. In Milwaukee II, the Court empha-
sized that displacement of federal common law depended on whether
Congress had spoken directly on the matter,159 and “whether the field
had been occupied, not whether it ha[d] been occupied in a particular
manner.”160 In finding that the Clean Water Act had displaced the plain-
tiff’s action under federal common law, the Milwaukee II Court focused
on three things: (1) the repeated description in the legislative history of
the Clean Water Act as “comprehensive”;161 (2) the fact that the Clean
Water Act regulated every point source discharge of pollution, only al-
lowing discharge with a permit;162 and (3) the fact that the Clean Water
Act provided the plaintiff with a forum in which it could plead its case.163
Unlike the Milwaukee II opinion, with its lengthy inquiry into the
legislative history of the Clean Water Act, the AEP Court made no ap-
parent effort to search the legislative history of the CAA to determine
157 Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 22–32.
158 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538–39 (emphasis added).
159 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 313–15 (1981).
160 Id. at 324.
161 Id. at 317–19.
162 Id. at 318.
163 Id. at 325–26.
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whether Congress intended it to be “comprehensive.”164 The AEP Court
was also dismissive of any attempt to require of the regulation of green-
house gases something analogous to the permit scheme in Milwaukee II:
As Milwaukee II made clear . . . the relevant question for
purposes of displacement is “whether the field has been
occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular
manner.” Of necessity, Congress selects different regula-
tory regimes to address different problems. Congress could
hardly preemptively prohibit every discharge of carbon di-
oxide unless covered by a permit. After all, we each emit
carbon dioxide merely by breathing.165
Thus, the Court made it clear that the key to displacement analysis would
not be the scope and extent of the actual EPA regulations, but instead, the
enabling legislation itself.166
The Supreme Court in AEP also emphasized the opportunities the
CAA provided the plaintiffs for a redress of their injuries. According to
the Court, “when Congress addresses a question previously governed by
a decision rested on federal common law . . . the need for such an un-
usual exercise of law-making by federal courts disappears.”167 The Court
noted that “it is primarily the office of Congress, not the federal courts, to
prescribe national policy in areas of special federal interest,” and stated
that the test for displacement of federal common law was whether the
legislation spoke directly to the question at issue.168
In support of its holding that the CAA displaced any federal
common law right to seek abatement of carbon dioxide emissions from
164 See generally Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527. In this regard, the
Court’s AEP opinion may be read as part of a trend away from reliance on legislative
history. See, e.g., David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court
and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1659 (2010) (attributing
the decline in the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history since the mid-1980s to a
“rightward shift in the ideological composition of the Court”). But see Frank B. Cross, The
Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 1983,
1995, 2001 (2007) (arguing that the “death” of legislative history has been exaggerated
by previous research, and suggesting that Justices tend to appeal to legislative history
in close, difficult cases, when other interpreted “methods may be inconclusive”).
165 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538 (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 324).
166 Id. at 2538–39.
167 Id. at 2537 (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314).
168 Id.
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fossil-fuel fired power plants, the Court noted the following features of
the Act:
Section 111 of the Act directs the EPA Administrator to
list “categories of stationary sources” that “in [her] judg-
ment . . . caus[e], or contribut[e] significantly to, air pollu-
tion which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare.” Once EPA lists a category, the
agency must establish standards of performance for emis-
sion of pollutants from new or modified sources within that
category. And, most relevant here, §7411(d) then requires
regulation of existing sources within the same category.
For existing sources, EPA issues emissions guidelines; in
compliance with those guidelines and subject to federal
oversight, the States then issue performance standards for
stationary sources within their jurisdiction.169
Thus, the text of the CAA, together with the Court’s holding in Massa-
chusetts v. EPA that greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide constitute
pollutants, requires the EPA, and not the federal courts, to address the
problem of greenhouse gases.
The Court also noted that “the Act provides multiple avenues for
enforcement,” which is significant given the importance of the reach of
remedial provisions in determining whether a “statute displaces federal
common law.”170 Perhaps most important is the right to petition for rule-
making under the Act:
If EPA does not set emissions limits for a particular pollut-
ant or source of pollution, States and private parties may
petition for a rulemaking on the matter, and EPA’s re-
sponse will be reviewable in federal court . . . . EPA is cur-
rently engaged in a § 7411 rulemaking to set standards for
greenhouse gas emissions from fossil-fuel fired power
plants. To settle litigation brought under §7607(b) by a
group that included the majority of the plaintiffs in this
very case, the agency agreed to complete that rulemaking
by May 2012. The Act itself thus provides a means to seek
169 Id. at 2537–38 (citations omitted).
170 Id. at 2538.
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limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic power
plants—the same relief the plaintiffs seek by invoking fed-
eral common law. We see no room for a parallel track.171
Thus, although the EPA has no obligation to regulate fossil-fuel burning
emitters of greenhouse gases, whereas that would necessarily mean put-
ting limitations on such emitters, the agency is obligated under the CAA
to regulate such emitters in the sense of hearing and responding to rule-
making petitions from those who have an interest in stopping or reducing
the emission of greenhouse gases from such facilities.
Should the EPA fail to respond to such petitions for rule-making
to the satisfaction of petitioners, the Act gives such petitioners the right
to seek review of the EPA decision in the Court of Appeals, and ultimately
to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari.172 However, the standard of
review for such EPA decisions is demanding for a petitioner, who must
show that the EPA’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”173 Moreover, any such
judicial review of an EPA decision would trigger “Chevron deference” from
the Court, which requires the reviewing court to defer to an administra-
tive agency in the interpretation of a piece of legislation that agency is
charged with enforcing.174 Thus, it is unlikely that the plaintiffs in AEP
would prevail in a challenge to an adverse EPA rule-making decision re-
garding greenhouse gas emissions.
E. Preserving a Public Nuisance Action Under State Law
The plaintiffs in AEP originally sought relief under both federal
and state common law.175 The Second Circuit followed the Milwaukee II
Court in holding that state and federal common law could not both apply
in this case: “If state law can be applied, there is no need for federal com-
mon law; if federal common law exists, it is because state law cannot be
used.”176 Thus, somewhat ironically, the Supreme Court’s finding of dis-
placement of the federal common law cause of action makes it more likely
171 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538 (citations omitted).
172 Id. at 2539.
173 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2006)).
174 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
175 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
176 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 392 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 314 n.7 (1981)).
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that the plaintiffs could successfully establish a public nuisance cause of ac-
tion under state common law, against at least some AEP-type defendants.
The Second Circuit, because it found a federal common law cause
of action, refused to consider the plaintiff’s alternative state law claim.177
The Supreme Court, upon finding displacement of the federal common law
cause of action, remanded the state law claim for further consideration
on remand.178 This section considers the possible merits of such a state law
claim, arguing that a state common law claim is probably not preempted
by the CAA or EPA regulations. However, this section also notes the signi-
ficant limitations in scope of such a state law claim, along with language
in the Supreme Court’s AEP decision that could support preemption.
Although the Supreme Court in AEP did not rely on subsequent
EPA regulatory actions in reaching its conclusion, those actions never-
theless reinforce a finding of displacement.179 However, the question of
preemption of state law is a significantly different question. This is made
clear by both the Supreme Court’s decision in Milwaukee II and the text
of the CAA. The key to understanding this is to keep in mind the differ-
ent types of authority given to federal and state courts. The Supreme
Court has long “recognized that federal common law is ‘subject to the
paramount authority of Congress’”180 and is resorted to only in absence
of a relevant act of Congress.181
After the passage of the 1972 Amendments to the Clean Water
Act, Illinois argued that, even though the City of Milwaukee had obtained
a permit for its activities under the new regulatory regime, it still had a
federal common law cause of action under which a federal court could im-
pose restrictions more demanding than the new federal requirements.182
The Milwaukee II Court rejected this position, saying that “[f]ederal courts
lack authority to impose more stringent effluent limitations under fed-
eral common law than those imposed by the agency charged by Congress
with administering this comprehensive scheme.”183 The federal courts
are purposefully insulated from the democratic process, and it would be
a violation of separation-of-powers principles to allow the federal courts
177 Id.
178 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
179 See generally City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II ), 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding
that “comprehensiveness” of subsequent legislation, including coverage of all point sources
of pollution, gave rise to displacement of federal common law).
180 Id. at 313 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)).
181 Id. at 314.
182 Id. at 323.
183 Id. at 320.
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to substitute their own policy judgments for those expressed through
Congressional legislation and administrative agency regulations.184
The preemption of state common law, however, is a very different
matter. Whereas the powers of the federal courts are limited in accord
with their non-democratic nature, our system of federalism starts from
the presumption that “the historic police powers of the States were not
to be superseded by Federal [legislation] unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.”185 Thus, unless Congress makes it very
clear that it intended to preclude the various states from enacting their
own, more stringent pollution requirements, those more stringent re-
quirements enacted by the states are enforceable, at least insofar as the
states can exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants.186
This retained right to impose more demanding restrictions on de-
fendants is not limited to state statutory law; it also applies to state admin-
istrative law, and more importantly for the purposes of public nuisance
actions, state common law decisions. In response to Illinois’s claim that the
Clean Water Act allowed the federal courts to impose a stricter require-
ment based in federal common law in place of the less demanding Clean
Water Act standard, the Milwaukee II Court said the following:
Respondents argue that congressional intent to preserve the
federal common-law remedy recognized in [Milwaukee I]
is evident in §§ 510 and 505(e) of the statute. Section 510
provides that nothing in the Act shall preclude States from
adopting and enforcing limitations on the discharge of pol-
lutants more stringent than those adopted under the Act.
It is one thing, however, to say that States may adopt more
stringent limitations through state administrative processes
or even that states may establish such limitations through
state nuisance law, and apply them to in-state discharges.
It is quite another to say that States may call upon federal
courts to employ federal common law to establish more strin-
gent standards applicable to out-of-state dischargers.187
184 Id. at 312–13.
185 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977)).
186 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (establishing the due-process
criteria for the exercise of jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants).
187 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 327–28 (citations omitted).
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This language demonstrates that the Court’s holding in Milwaukee II
applies to the displacement of federal common law, and says nothing
about the preemption of state common law.
The same analysis applies in determining whether the plaintiffs
in AEP should still have a state common law nuisance claim after the
Court’s finding that the CAA had displaced their federal common law
claim.188 Preemption of state law requires that Congress’s intent to do so
be clear and manifest.189 An example of such a clear and manifest intent
to preempt state law would be Section 209 of the Act: “No State or any
political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any stan-
dard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines subject to this part.”190 Thus, it seems extremely
unlikely that the State of California could successfully sue automakers
under a state common law public nuisance claim, since that would con-
stitute an attempt to enforce its own standard on new car emissions, and
Section 209 of the Act expressly forbids such state actions.
Not only does the CAA lack a provision expressly prohibiting the
states from imposing their own, more stringent requirements for green-
house gas emissions from stationary sources, it also includes a “citizen
suits” provision. This provision states: “Nothing in this section shall re-
strict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under
any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any emission standard
or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the
Administrator or a State agency),”191 thus further supporting the non-
preemption of state law in this area.
But most important in this regard is the section of the CAA
entitled “Retention of State Authority,” which states that except for cer-
tain provisions regarding moving sources of emissions such as auto-
mobiles and aircraft,
[N]othing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right
of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or en-
force (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions
of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control
or abatement of air pollution; except that if an emission
standard or limitation is in effect under an applicable
188 See Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp., 798 F. Supp. 1280, 1282–84 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
189 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316.
190 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006).
191 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2006).
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implementation plan or under section 7411 or section 7412
of this title, such State or political subdivision may not adopt
or enforce any emission standard or limitation which is
less stringent than the standard or limitation under such
plan or section.192
The “Retention of State Authority” or “savings” provision of the CAA closely
parallels Section 510 of the Clean Water Act, discussed by the Milwaukee
II Court.193 Assuming that state common law public nuisance suits would
constitute a more stringent restriction on emitters of greenhouse gases
over and above existing EPA requirements, the CAA preserves the state
common law action against the defendants in AEP.194
F. Limitations on the CAA’s Savings Clause
It is important to note, however, that there are limits to the power
of the CAA’s savings clause to preserve the state common law action. In
Clean Air Markets v. Pataki,195 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a New York statute aimed at reducing the effects of acid rain in the
Adirondacks was preempted by the CAA in spite of the CAA’s savings
clause because the New York statute was in “actual conflict” with the
CAA, due to its status “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”196
The Clean Air Markets case had its origins in Congress’s 1990
amendment of the CAA. Title IV of the 1990 amendments had the express
purpose of reducing the effects of acid deposition, including acid rain,
“through reductions in annual emissions of sulfur dioxide.”197 Congress
developed an emission allocation and transfer program, or cap-and-trade
system,198 where certain emitters were allowed an annual allowance of
sulfur dioxide emissions, and if they emitted an amount less than their
192 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006).
193 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 327–29.
194 See Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114–15 (1972) (stating that, while
Congress has preempted the states with respect to emissions from most moving sources
including automobiles and airplanes, the states retain broad authority under the CAA
to control stationary sources such as factories and incinerators); Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 798 F. Supp. 1280, 1282 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that the CAA expressly permits
more stringent state regulation of stationary sources).
195 Clean Air Mkts. Grp. v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003).
196 Id. at 84, 87 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
197 Id. at 84 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (2006)).
198 Id.
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quota, the excess allowances were transferrable to “any other person who
[held] such allowances.”199 The purpose of the cap-and-trade system was
to create a financial incentive for utility companies to reduce their sulfur
dioxide emissions.200
By the end of the twentieth century, acid rain was an especially
serious problem in New York’s Adirondacks region.201 According to the
Second Circuit, the “thin, calcium-poor soils and igneous rocks in this
area [made] it highly susceptible to acidification,” with acid deposition
causing “substantial harm to aquatic life and other natural resources.”202
Complicating the problem was the fact that sulfur dioxide emissions are
capable of traveling hundreds of miles, and that much of the acid depo-
sition in the Adirondacks originated not in New York, but instead in four-
teen “upwind” states: New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, Ohio, Michigan,
Illinois, Kentucky, Indiana, and Wisconsin.203
In 2000, the New York state legislature addressed this problem
by passing the Air Pollution Mitigation Law, under which the New York
State Public Service Commission was required to assess an “‘air pollution
mitigation offset’ upon any New York utility whose SO2 [sulfur dioxide]
allowances [were] sold or traded to one of the fourteen upwind states.”204
Moreover, if the New York utility sold the emissions allowance to a non-
upwind party, it could avoid the assessment of the offset payment only
if the utility attached to the allowance a restrictive covenant preventing
“their subsequent transfer to any of the fourteen upwind states.”205 Thus,
the New York statute had the effect of undermining any transfer of ex-
cess sulfur dioxide allowances from New York utilities to parties in any
of the fourteen upwind states, since the restrictive covenant would pre-
vent the purchaser from making use of the allowance.206
A collection of “electricity generation companies, SO2 emissions
allowance brokers, mining companies, and trade associations” filed suit,
claiming that the New York statue was preempted by Title IV of the 1990
CAA amendments.207 The defendants, including the state of New York,
199 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b).
200 Clean Air Mkts., 338 F.3d at 84.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Clean Air Mkts., 338 F.3d at 88–89.
207 Id. at 84–85.
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appealed to the savings clause of the CAA, which, according to the Second
Circuit, “reserves for the states the power to impose on their own utilities
more stringent requirements for air pollution control or abatement than
mandated by federal law.”208 New York’s position was that its restrictions
on the CAA cap-and-trade system was simply the sort of more restrictive
state regulation provided for by the CAA’s savings clause.209 However,
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of this argument,
partly because the New York statute had the effect of regulating emissions
outside its borders.210 This is potentially an important limitation on state
common law public nuisance claims in the area of climate change, given
the global nature of greenhouse gas emissions such as carbon dioxide.211
The Second Circuit’s decision in Clean Air Markets included other
language that should be of concern to those interested in relying on the
CAA’s savings clause to preserve a state law public nuisance claim for
harms associated with climate change. In its discussion of the New York
acid rain statute, the Second Circuit relied heavily on language from
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs, a case decided by the
Supreme Court in 1985.212 In Hillsborough County, the Supreme Court
stated that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution “invalidates state
laws that ‘interfere with, or are contrary to,’ federal law”213 and identified
three distinct ways in which federal law may supersede state law under
the Supremacy Clause.
First, “Congress is empowered to preempt state law by so stating
in express terms.”214 An example of such preemption of state law would
be the CAA’s prohibition against state regulation of emissions from
new automobiles.215 Second, preemption of all state law in a given field
“may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently
208 Id. at 85.
209 Id. at 89.
210 Id.
211 See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101: UNDERSTANDING
AND RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 6 (2011), available at http://www.c2es.org
/docUploads/climate101-fullbook_0.pdf (noting that greenhouse gas emissions are rising
fastest in developing countries such as China and India, and that while U.S. emissions
are expected to remain relatively flat over the next decade, China’s and India’s emis-
sions are projected to grow by approximately forty-five percent by 2020).
212 Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
213 Id. at 712 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 82 (1824)).
214 Id. at 713.
215 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress ‘left no
room’ for supplementary state regulation.”216
Third, “[e]ven where Congress has not completely displaced state
regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it ac-
tually conflicts with federal law.”217 The Hillsborough County Court noted
that an obvious instance in which state law actually conflicts with federal
law occurs when “‘compliance with both . . . is a physical impossibility.’”218
But the Court also stated that an actual conflict between state and fed-
eral law exists when a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” in its
enactment of federal legislation.219
It is this third type of conflict between state and federal law that
the Second Circuit found at work in the Clean Air Markets case. New York
argued that its anti–acid rain statute actually supported the ultimate
purpose of Title IV of the CAA amendments—i.e., “to protect natural
resources.”220 But the Second Circuit pointed to another Supreme Court
decision—International Paper Co. v. Ouellette—which held that “[i]n
determining whether [a state law] stands as an obstacle to the full im-
plementation of [a federal statute], it is not enough to say that the ulti-
mate goal of both federal and state law is [the same].”221 According to the
Second Circuit, even in cases where the federal and state statutes share a
common goal, the state law is preempted “if it interferes with the methods
by which the federal statute was designed to reach this goal.”222
The Second Circuit held that the New York statute did indeed in-
terfere with the methods chosen by Congress to deal with the problems of
sulfur dioxide emissions and acid rain.223 It was the judgment of Congress
that the best way of achieving reductions of sulfur dioxide, taking into
consideration the interests of the nation as a whole, was the cap-and-
trade system called for by Title IV.224 The New York statute did not merely
impose an additional restriction on emitters of sulfur dioxide. It instead
undermined the system of financial incentives designed by Congress to
216 Hillsborough Cnty., 471 U.S. at 713.
217 Id.
218 Id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)).
219 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
220 Clean Air Mkts. Grp. v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2003).
221 Id. (quoting Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987)).
222 Id. (quoting Int’l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 494).
223 Id. at 87, 89.
224 Id. at 87–88.
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effect what it understood to be the most efficient and cost-effective way
of addressing the problems of sulfur dioxide emissions and acid rain,
thereby “stand[ing] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”225
A recent decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals should
be of additional concern to the plaintiffs in AEP. In North Carolina v.
TVA, the Fourth Circuit reversed a lower court’s granting of an injunc-
tion requiring emissions controls on the defendant’s power generators.226
Although this was not a climate change case,227 it was a public nuisance
action,228 and the Circuit Court ruled that North Carolina’s attempt to
impose stricter requirements than those mandated by the CAA was
preempted by the CAA in spite of the CAA’s savings clause.229
The Fourth Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s decision in
International Paper v. Ouellette,230 which held that the savings clause
of the Clean Water Act allows a state to impose more stringent stan-
dards on polluters within its own borders, but does not allow a state to
impose stricter emission requirements on sources in other states.231 The
Fourth Circuit held that, while it would be permissible for North Carolina
to impose more stringent mandates on emitters within its own borders,
it did not have the authority to regulate emission sources in other states,
such as Alabama and Tennessee.232 This establishes an important limi-
tation to state law climate change lawsuits: even if the CAA’s savings
clause allows a state to impose more stringent requirements on in-state
sources of greenhouse gases, it will have no authority to impose such
standards on sources in other states.233
Also of concern for friends of the state law approach is the
Hillsborough County Court’s second way in which federal law can su-
persede state law under the Supremacy Clause: preemption of all state
law in a given field “may be inferred where the scheme of federal regu-
lation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference
225 Id.
226 North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2010).
227 This case dealt with a group of toxins already heavily regulated by the CAA: sulfur
dioxide, nitrous oxide, particulate matter, and ozone. Id. at 296.
228 Id. at 297.
229 Id. at 303–04.
230 Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
231 See id. at 493–94.
232 North Carolina, 615 F.3d at 296, 302–03, 306.
233 Id. at 306–07.
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that Congress ‘left no room’ for supplementary state regulation.”234 The
implication here is that an explicit revocation of the CAA’s savings clause
is not required to conclude that Congress has acted on an intent to abro-
gate the savings clause, at least for a limited area of law.235 If the pend-
ing EPA regulations turn out to be sufficiently comprehensive, so that
one can reasonably infer that Congress has intended the federal ap-
proach to be the exclusive approach, then the state common law provi-
sions would be preempted, in spite of the very strong language of the
CAA’s savings clause.
In its AEP decision, the Supreme Court explicitly left open the
question whether plaintiffs might have a cause of action under state
law.236 However, there is language in the Court’s opinion suggesting that
the Court might be inclined to find preemption of state law by the CAA
and EPA regulations:
The appropriate amount of regulation in any particular
greenhouse gas-producing sector cannot be prescribed in
a vacuum; as with other questions of national or interna-
tional policy, informed assessment of competing interests
is required. Along with the environmental benefit poten-
tially achievable, our Nation’s energy needs and the possi-
bility of economic disruption must weigh in the balance.237
Although the Court offered these considerations in further support of the
displacement of federal common law, one might use these same consider-
ations to counsel against allowing state court judges and legislatures to
upset the delicate balancing of national interests effected by the CAA
and EPA regulations.
The AEP Court noted that the current federal regulatory regime
explicitly provides for cooperation between the federal government and
the states:
The Clean Air Act entrusts such complex balancing to EPA
in the first instance, in combination with state regulators.
Each “standard of performance” EPA sets must “tak[e] into
234 Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
235 See id.
236 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2011).
237 Id. at 2539.
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account the cost of achieving [emissions] reduction and any
nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy
requirements.” (EPA may permit state plans to deviate from
generally applicable emissions standards upon demonstra-
tion that costs are “[u]n-reasonable”). EPA may “distinguish
among classes, types, and sizes” of stationary sources in ap-
portioning responsibility for emissions reductions. And the
agency may waive compliance with emission limits to permit
a facility to test drive an “innovative technological system”
that has “not [yet] been adequately demonstrated.”238
Although the Court recognized that the states have an important role to
play within the EPA’s regulatory scheme, which it described as allowing
“each State to take the first cut at determining how best to achieve EPA
emissions standards within its domain,” it is important to note that the
standards remain the EPA’s standards, and it is not clear what role, if
any, state court decisions based on common law public nuisance doctrine
would play in the EPA’s regulatory scheme.239
The Savings Clause of the CAA explicitly provides that states are
free to impose standards that are more stringent than those provided for
in the Act. However, the courts have interpreted the Savings Clause as
not allowing states to impose stricter standards that have the effect of
interfering with the federal regulatory scheme.240 Given the unusually
broad range of policy interests implicated by the regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions, it is possible that the Supreme Court would find more
restrictive state regulations in this area preempted by the federal reg-
ulatory scheme. Echoing many of the concerns raised by the federal
district courts in dismissing climate change public nuisance cases on
non-justiciability grounds,241 the Court stated the following in AEP:
It is altogether fitting that Congress designated an expert
agency, here, EPA, as best suited to serve as primary regula-
tor of greenhouse gas emissions. The expert agency is surely
better equipped to do the job than individual district judges
issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions. Federal judges lack
238 Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
239 Id.
240 See id.
241 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272–74 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); infra notes 283–285 and accompanying text.
2012] CLIMATE CHANGE AND PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW 901
the scientific, economic, and technological resources an
agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order.242
Although the Court’s statement here referred to federal court judges, it
would seem that any concerns about the lack of scientific expertise would
apply equally to state court judges.
Because we do not yet know all of the details of the regulatory
system the EPA will eventually implement for greenhouse gas emissions,
it is difficult to say whether a state common law public nuisance claim
would actually conflict with EPA regulations in the way that the New
York statute conflicted with the CAA’s Title IV cap-and-trade system.243
But it is at least clear that the mere presence of a savings clause in the
CAA is not in itself sufficient to protect a state common law public nui-
sance action for greenhouse gas emissions.
IV. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND NON-JUSTICIABILITY
Although climate change public nuisance claims fared well at the
circuit court level in the two instances where the Court of Appeals con-
sidered whether such claims could go forward,244 federal district courts
have been unreceptive to such claims, with all four of the district courts
to hear climate change public nuisance claims having dismissed them.245
However, instead of relying on the argument that federal and state public
nuisance law had been displaced or preempted by federal statutory law,246
242 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539–40.
243 In Clean Air Markets the court cited case law stating that “[f]ederal regulations have
the same preemptive force as federal statutes.” Clean Air Mkts. Grp. v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82,
88 (2003) (quoting Freeman v. Burlington Broads., Inc., 204 F.3d 311, 321–22 (2d Cir. 2000)).
244 Comer v. Murphy Oil, USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power
Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
245 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 8–10; Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15,
at 10 n.5.
246 This is not surprising given the EPA’s lack of regulations with respect to greenhouse
gas emissions. Note the Solicitor General’s emphasis on future EPA greenhouse gas reg-
ulations and actions taken after the circuit court’s reversal of the district court in AEP.
Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 22–32; see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6,
at 11. According to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Comer,
The Clean Air Act and other federal legislation on air quality are much
less comprehensive than the [Clean Water Act], as amended. The defen-
dants here do not contend, and the district courts in American Electric
and General Motors did not hold, that any act of Congress had preempted
state law with respect to global warming.
Comer, 585 F.3d at 878–79.
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these district courts instead held that climate change public nuisance
cases presented the courts with non-justiciable political questions.247
Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court in AEP included
no discussion of the political question doctrine, or the concept of a non-
justiciable political question, in reversing the Second Circuit, instead
relying exclusively on a displacement analysis. This Part describes the
application of the political question doctrine to climate change public
nuisance cases, and considers the plausibility of the district courts’ con-
clusion on this score. The relative weakness of the non-justiciability argu-
ment, combined with the availability of a strong displacement argument,
explains why the Supreme Court avoided the district courts’ approach.
A. The Political Question Doctrine
Although the political question doctrine has its roots in Marbury
v. Madison,248 the modern leading case249 for the doctrine is the Supreme
Court’s 1962 Baker v. Carr250 decision. According to Erwin Chemerinsky,
“virtually every case considering the political question doctrine quotes”
the following language from Baker251:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a po-
litical question is found a textually demonstrable commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s under-
taking independent resolution without expressing lack of
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an un-
usual need for unquestioning adherence to a political de-
cision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
247 See supra notes 31–59 and accompanying text.
248 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169–70 (1803); see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 148 (5th ed. 2007); Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine:
Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1458 (2005).
249 Lauren Fielder Redman, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Using a “Shield”
Statute as a “Sword” for Obtaining Federal Jurisdiction in Art and Antiquities Cases, 31
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 781, 806 (2008).
250 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
251 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 248, at 149.
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from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.252
Chemerinsky criticizes this influential language as essentially useless in
identifying what counts as a political question,253 and many other schol-
ars have attacked the doctrine itself.254 Nevertheless, the doctrine sur-
vives,255 with courts sometimes relying on it in the context of environ-
mental law.256
B. The AEP District Court’s Appeal to the Political
Question Doctrine: The Baker Factors
The district court’s decision in AEP treated the political question
doctrine as implicating constitutional issues of the separation of powers:
“To determine if a case is justiciable in light of the separation of powers
ordained by the Constitution, a court must decide ‘whether the duty as-
serted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined,
and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded.’”257
The court went on to extract from Baker258 the following six situations
recognized by the courts:
[A]s indicating the existence of a non-justiciable political
question: [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s
252 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
253 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 248, at 149.
254 See id.; Choper, supra note 248, at 1459; Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the
“Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1985).
255 See Choper, supra note 248, at 1459–60.
256 See Philip Weinberg, “Political Questions”: An Invasive Species Infecting the Courts,
19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 155 (2008) (“Recent court rulings have distorted the hoary
‘political questions’ doctrine into an excuse to evade the courts’ responsibility to decide
serious justiciable issues in environmental law.”).
257 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting
Baker, 369 U.S. at 198).
258 These “situations” represent the AEP district court’s take on the Baker language cited
by CHEMERINSKY, supra note 248.
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undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of the government;
or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a po-
litical decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of em-
barrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.259
C. Baker Factor One and Displacement
Situation [1] bears some resemblance to the displacement argu-
ment described in Part III. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit in Comer blurred the
line between the displacement argument and the political question doc-
trine when it treated the first Baker factor as referring to both the text
of the Constitution and to federal statutory law:
Plainly, the Baker v. Carr “formulations” were not written
as stand-alone definitions of a “political question.” They are
open-textured, interpretive guides to aid federal courts in
deciding whether a question is entrusted by the Constitution
or federal laws exclusively to a federal political branch for
its decision. The Baker formulations are not self-sufficient
definitions, but must be used together with the Constitution
and federal laws to decide whether a particular constitu-
tional or statutory provision commits a question solely to
a political branch for decision.260
On this understanding of the first Baker factor, displacement by federal
statute (such as the CAA) is one way in which an issue can become a non-
justiciable political question.
The Comer court’s treatment of the first Baker factor as including
federal statutory law is unusual, and most authorities treat the first Baker
factor as involving only the text of the Constitution, and not federal stat-
utory law.261 Once it becomes clear that the first Baker factor requires a
259 Connecticut, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 271–72 (brackets in original).
260 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d at 855, 872 (5th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); see
also id. at 870, 875.
261 Even the Comer Court seemed to recognize that the authorities it cited with regard to
the first Baker factor were concerned with commitment of an issue to the political branches
by the text of the Constitution, and not federal statutory law. See id. at 873, 875, 879; see
also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 (1969) (“In order to determine whether there
has been a textual commitment to a coordinate department of the Government, [a court]
must interpret the Constitution.”); Redish, supra note 254, at 1031.
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commitment of an issue to a political branch by the text of the Constitution,
it is not surprising that defendants262 in climate change public nuisance
cases have tended to gravitate toward the Commerce Clause,263 and those
parts of the Constitution granting foreign policy-related powers, in apply-
ing the doctrine.264 Although it is undeniable that public nuisance suits
for damages related to climate change have the potential for significant im-
pact on interstate commerce and foreign policy, this is not enough to find
a non-justiciable political question. As the Second Circuit pointed out in its
AEP decision,265 the Supreme Court has made it clear that the fact that an
issue has political implications does not in itself make it non-justiciable.266
The Second Circuit in AEP noted reasons for thinking that the
Supreme Court would be hesitant to order dismissal of climate change
cases by appeal to the political question doctrine, pointing out the high
bar that the Baker Court set for non-justiciability: “Unless one of these
formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no
dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political question’s
presence.”267 The Second Circuit also noted that, in spite of “ample liti-
gation, the Supreme Court has only rarely found that a political question
bars its adjudication of an issue.”268 The court also quoted one scholar
who noted that, “in the almost forty years since Baker v. Carr was decided,
a majority of the Court has found only two issues to present political
questions, and both involved strong textual anchors for finding that the
constitutional decision rested with the political branches.”269 Another
262 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 324–25 (2d Cir. 2009).
263 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
264 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See California v. General Motors, in which the district
court found that the plaintiffs’ claim did implicate a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment to the political branches—viz., Congress’s power over interstate com-
merce and its authority over the conduct of foreign policy. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL
2726871, at *13–14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
265 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 323.
266 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 217 (1962) (cautioning that the doctrine “is one
of ‘political questions,’ not one of ‘political cases’” and that with respect to foreign affairs
“it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance”).
267 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 321 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
268 Id.
269 Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 267–68 (2002). The first issue
was whether the Supreme Court had the authority to supervise the Ohio National Guard
in the wake of the 1970 Kent State shootings, while the second issue, which arose in the
context of the Watergate controversy, was whether the Senate could impeach a federal
judge based on the report of a fact-finding committee. Id. at 270–73.
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scholar reinforces this sense of the weakness of the political question doc-
trine, pointing to the Supreme Court’s Bush v. Gore decision, “in which
the Justices voted 5 to 4 to resolve a presidential election dispute without
so much as mentioning the doctrine.”270
Given the lack of a clear textual basis in the Constitution for con-
cluding that the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions is committed ex-
clusively to the legislative and executive branches, it is not surprising that
federal district courts seeking to avoid the adjudication of climate change
public nuisance cases avoided basing dismissal on the first Baker factor,271
despite its status as the most straightforward and least controversial of
the factors.272 Instead, district courts seeking to dismiss such cases have
based their decisions on other Baker factors.
D. The Remaining Baker Factors: Policy Determinations and the
Absence of Judicially Discoverable Standards
Returning to our list of the Baker factors, we are now in a position
to understand the relationship between Baker factor [1] and the issue
of displacement by federal statutory law. Whether one interprets Baker
factor [1] narrowly, as involving the text of the Constitution, or more
broadly as including federal statutory law, the first Baker factor is easy
to grasp: once an issue has been textually committed to one of the politi-
cal branches, that issue is no longer judiciable. Situations [4] through [6]
are conceptually tied to the first Baker factor, and could be read as prag-
matic or prudential reasons273 for the courts to refrain from passing judg-
ment on issues entrusted to the political branches of government.274
270 Choper, supra note 248, at 1459.
271 The exception here is the California v. General Motors court. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007
WL 2726871, at *13–14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
272 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004); Choper, supra note 248, at 1463.
273 The Solicitor General proposed an alternative argument for reversal of the Second
Circuit, based on a “prudential standing” theory, according to which the plaintiffs’ suits
should have been barred as generalized grievances more appropriately addressed by the
political branches of our government. Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 11–22.
The Supreme Court noted the Solicitor General’s argument but dismissed it without
discussion. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 n.6. The Court’s lack
of interest in the prudential standing argument is not surprising, given that the doctrine
has in recent years fallen out of favor with the Supreme Court, and has been subjected
to scathing criticism from academic critics, with some calling for abandonment of the
doctrine. Barkow, supra note 269, at 267; David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception:
Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1439, 1440–41 (1999).
274 See Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 11–22; ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 184 (1962); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 248, at 150–51.
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Situations [2] and [3], however, are together conceptually distinct
from the others, and suggest that, even absent an entrustment of the ques-
tion to Congress or the executive branch by the Constitution directly,275 or
by federal statutory law by way of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause,276
there are issues which, by their very nature, are beyond the competence
of the judiciary. Accordingly, the district courts that have dismissed cli-
mate change public nuisance claims by relying on the political question
doctrine have tended to use some combination of [2] and [3], holding that
the adjudication of climate change public nuisance cases requires either
an initial policy determination the court is not competent to make,277 or
requires the court to decide the case in the absence of judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards.278
While the case for a reversal of the Second Circuit’s AEP decision
by appeal to the first Baker factor is weak, factors [2] and [3] provide more
support. The district court in AEP rested its decision mainly on factor [3],
holding that it could not decide the case without appeal to an initial po-
licy determination requiring non-judicial discretion.279 The district court
in Kivalina also relied on factor [3]280 in dismissing its climate change
public nuisance case, but the Kivalina court relied on Baker factor [2] as
well, finding that deciding the case would require issuing a decision with-
out reference to judicially discoverable and manageable standards for re-
solving the case.281
E. The Circuit Courts’ Treatment of the Judiciability Issue
Although the district court in AEP relied mainly on the “initial
policy determination” factor in its dismissal of the plaintiffs’ case, the
Second Circuit, in its review of the district court, considered arguments
related both to this factor and factor [2], having to do with judicially
275 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229 (1993) (providing an example of a
constitutional grant of power to Congress).
276 U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
277 See California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *6–13
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007); infra notes 279–280.
278 See infra note 281; California, 2007 WL 2726871, at *14–16.
279 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The
AEP district court’s only mention of a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards” comes in the context of the court’s listing of the various Baker factors. Id. at 272.
280 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
281 Id. at 876. The Kivalina court also found a lack of Article III standing. Id. at 883; cf.
supra note 47.
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discoverable and manageable standards.282 Thus, the Second Circuit’s de-
cision offers a useful framework for considering the viability of political
question defenses in climate change public nuisance cases in general.
It is perhaps not surprising that federal district courts and circuit
courts differ on whether deciding public nuisance climate change cases
require the courts to venture beyond their natural realm of competence,
given that the burdens of fact-finding will fall primarily on the district
courts. The district court in AEP, in justifying its dismissal of the plain-
tiffs’ action, listed the considerations that would have to be addressed in
settling the case at hand:
[G]iven the numerous contributors of greenhouse gases,
should the societal costs of reducing such emissions be
borne by just a segment of the electricity-generating in-
dustry and their industrial and other consumers?
Should those costs be spread across the entire electricity-
generating industry (including utilities in the plaintiff
States)? Other industries?
What are the economic implications of these choices?
What are the implications for the nation’s energy inde-
pendence and, by extension, its national security?283
The district court in Comer raised similar concerns in justifying its
dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims for damages related to Hurricane Katrina284:
“[T]he problem [in this case] is one in which this court is
simply ill-equipped or unequipped with the power that it
has to address these issues.” . . . [I]t is a debate which sim-
ply has no place in the court, until such time as Congress
enacts legislation which sets appropriate standards by
which this court can measure conduct . . . and develops
standards by which . . . juries can adjudicate facts and ap-
ply the law . . . . Under the circumstances, I think that the
plaintiffs are asking the court to develop those standards,
282 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 326–32 (2d Cir. 2009).
283 Connecticut, 406 F. Supp. at 273.
284 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 nn. 1–2 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting the
hearing transcript from the district court).
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and it is something that this court simply is not empowered
to do. . . . [Plaintiffs’ complaint asks] this court to do what
Baker v. Carr told me not to do, and that is to balance eco-
nomic, environmental, foreign policy, and national secu-
rity interests and make an initial policy determination
of a kind which is simply nonjudicial. Adjudication of
Plaintiffs’ claims in this case would necessitate the formu-
lation of standards dictating, for example, the amount of
greenhouse gas emissions that would be excessive and
the scientific and policy reasons behind those standards.
These policy decisions are best left to the executive and
legislative branches of the government, who are not only
in the best position to make those decisions but are consti-
tutionally empowered to do so.285
This passage illustrates both the discomfort a district court judge might
find in addressing the various public policy issues surrounding climate
change, along with the way in which Baker factors [2] and [3] can merge
in a court’s reasoning about such cases, despite other courts’ treatment
of these factors as distinct.
Although the Second Circuit attempted to break apart Baker
factors [2] and [3], devoting separate sections in its opinion to them,286 a
common theme appears in both sections—viz., that what the plaintiffs in
AEP are asking the courts to do is not significantly different from what
state and federal courts have done over the years in applying the com-
mon law principles of nuisance law.287 On the question of whether public
nuisance law provides the courts with judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards to decide cases such as AEP, the Second Circuit pointed
to a series of cases where the federal courts have appealed to the rules
and standards of tort law in adjudicating various water and air pollution
nuisance cases.
The Second Circuit noted a pair of Supreme Court cases from
the early 1900s to illustrate the competence of the federal courts in
deciding cases by appeal to the standards of ordinary nuisance law. In
1901, the Supreme Court decided Missouri I, a public nuisance case in
which Missouri sued to prevent Illinois from dumping sewage into the
Mississippi River, holding that Missouri could maintain a lawsuit for
285 Id. at 860 n.2.
286 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 326–31.
287 Id.
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equitable relief even before it had suffered injury.288 When Illinois started
to discharge into the river, Missouri sued again, this time seeking an in-
junction against the discharge as a public nuisance.289 According to the
Second Circuit, the Supreme Court in Missouri II “carefully appraised
the sophisticated scientific and expert evidence offered (such as whether
the typhoid bacillus could survive the waterborne journey), weighed the
equities, and concluded that Missouri had not made its case, particularly
with respect to establishing injury and causation.”290
For another example of what the Second Circuit described as “the
federal courts’ masterful handling of complex public nuisance issues”
it cited a series of appearances the State of Georgia made before the
Supreme Court in its public nuisance suit against a pair of Tennessee
copper foundries.291 Georgia claimed that emissions from the copper
plants were destroying forests, orchards, and crops in Georgia. Between
1907 and 1916, the Supreme Court issued four decisions in this dispute,
eventually setting definitive emission limits, imposing monitoring require-
ments, and apportioning damages among the defendants.292 According to
the Second Circuit, the Missouri and Georgia cases were just the “first
in a long line of federal common law of nuisance cases where federal
courts employed familiar public nuisance precepts, grappled with com-
plex scientific evidence, and resolved the issues presented, based on a
fully developed record.”293
While the cases cited by the Second Circuit undeniably show a
history of application of traditional nuisance doctrine to settle interstate
pollution disputes, climate change public nuisance cases such as AEP are
288 Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri I), 180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901).
289 Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri II), 200 U.S. 496, 517–18 (1906).
290 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 326–27.
291 Id. at 327.
292 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650, 650–51 (1916).
293 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 327. The court then cited several cases as further examples:
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (holding that sewage dis-
charge was a public nuisance which could be adjudicated by the federal courts due to the
Clean Water Act’s lack of remedy); New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931)
(“seeking to enjoin New York from dumping garbage into the ocean and polluting New
Jersey beaches and water”); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (“seeking
to enjoin, as a public nuisance, a Minnesota irrigation project that contributed to flooding
of North Dakota farmland”); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (“seeking to
enjoin sewage discharge into boundary waters and causing pollution”); Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851) (“alleging interference with
navigation on Ohio River by low bridge as constituting public nuisance”).
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arguably distinguishable. All of the cases cited by the Second Circuit in-
volved localized disputes between adjacent states or parties in adjacent
states.294 The Supreme Court’s ordering a Tennessee copper plant to stop
emitting fumes that are passing the state border into Georgia and damag-
ing property there or ordering New York to stop damaging New Jersey’s
shoreline by dumping its garbage into the river are not the kind of de-
cisions that can be expected to have very wide ranging consequences akin
to a federal court’s issuing of an injunction against a power company for
its contribution to climate change, which is by its very nature a global
phenomenon, with causes and effects diffused throughout the world.295
The Second Circuit was dismissive of the defendants’ claims that
climate change public nuisance lawsuits implicated the political branches’
authority to regulate foreign policy and interstate commerce.296 However,
it is undeniable that a federal court’s decision to issue an injunction against
a large power company to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to certain
specified levels297 would have implications with respect to foreign policy
and the national economy that would be absent or significantly attenuated
in the line of much more localized cases trumpeted by the Second Circuit.298
In its consideration of the district court’s holding that deciding the
case at hand required a non-judicial initial policy determination, the Second
Circuit again pointed to past cases of the federal courts using nuisance law
to settle interstate pollution cases, focusing especially on Milwaukee I,299
emphasizing that “if regulatory gaps exist, common law fills those inter-
stices.”300 However, characterizing what the Second Circuit would have
the district court do in this case as mere interstitial gap filling understates
the wide range of complex policy issues implicated by such a decision.301
294 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 326–27. The Court cited only cases involving bordering states:
New York and New Jersey; North Dakota and Minnesota; Illinois and Wisconsin; Georgia
and Tennessee; and Missouri and Illinois. Id.; see supra note 293 (summarizing several
of the cases cited by the Second Circuit).
295 See Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 14–15; PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 211.
296 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 324.
297 See id. at 318 (noting that petitioners sought this type of relief in AEP).
298 See California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *13–14
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
299 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 330.
300 Id.; Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 287 (2d Cir. 2007); see United
States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979).
301 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 31–34; Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note
15, at 14–17.
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Whereas it was plausible for the Court in Milwaukee I to think that
Illinois’s lack of a remedy against Milwaukee was the result of the leg-
islature failing to consider the possibility of such an interstate harm, it is
simply not plausible to contend that the lack of greenhouse gas regula-
tions is due to legislative oversight. It is instead a consequence of the lack
of consensus in our political culture about the best way, all things con-
sidered, for the government to address the problem of climate change.302
Given the disanalogies between climate change cases and the sort
of public nuisance cases relied upon by the Second Circuit, the Supreme
Court probably could have justified reversal of the Second Circuit on non-
justiciability grounds, especially in light of the wide range of public policy
issues implicated by climate change. But the political question doctrine
has endured harsh criticism in recent years, and there is evidence that
the doctrine has fallen out of favor with the Supreme Court.303 It is there-
fore not surprising that the Court instead relied on displacement analysis
in reversing the Second Circuit.
Although the Court found displacement of the federal common law
claim independently of any regulatory activity by the EPA,304 one cannot
help but suspect that the fact of such activity encouraged the Court to
ignore the more problematic political question doctrine and instead rely
on a displacement analysis. Accordingly, if the various district courts had
been able to consider the climate change cases in light of recent EPA reg-
ulatory activity, it is possible that those courts too would have relied on a
displacement analysis, instead of holding that the cases presented them
with non-justiciable political questions.305
302 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Where Did Global Warming Go?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/sunday-review/whatever-happened-to-global
-warming.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1&hp (describing the difficulties associated with pass-
ing climate change legislation in the United States).
303 See supra notes 253–256, 267–270, 283–285 and accompanying text.
304 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011).
305 Would the Court’s invocation of the political question doctrine have precluded plaintiffs
from proceeding with a state common law public nuisance claim? The answer is clearly
no, especially if the Court’s reversal were based on Baker factors [2] or [3]. See Native
Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 882–83 (N.D. Cal. 2009);
California v. Gen. Motors, No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2007), (both dismissing complaint without prejudice, explicitly allowing the plaintiffs to
refile in state court). The Supreme Court has made clear that the political question doc-
trine does not apply to state courts: “This Court, of course, may not prohibit state courts
from deciding political questions, any more than it may prohibit them from deciding
questions that are moot, so long as they do not trench upon exclusively federal questions
of foreign policy.” Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1005 n.2 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
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CONCLUSION
There has been much hand-wringing of late over the issue of
climate change and public nuisance doctrine, with some predicting a tidal
wave of costly litigation against utilities and other emitters of green-
house gases. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in AEP v. Connecticut,
holding that any such cause of action based on federal common law was
displaced by the CAA, showed much of this excitement to be unwarranted.
However, the Court explicitly left open the possibility that such cases could
proceed under state law.
The Court’s decision in AEP has a number of important implica-
tions. There were several arguments available to the Court, under which
it could have reversed the Second Circuit’s decision. The Court could have
followed the path of the district courts, who had unanimously dismissed
climate change public nuisance cases as presenting non-justiciable po-
litical questions. The Court’s ignoring of such an approach in favor of a
displacement analysis should undermine future appeals to the political
question doctrine, which had already suffered harsh criticism from the le-
gal academy.306 Similarly, it is noteworthy that the Court all but ignored
the Solicitor General’s prudential standing argument, which is another doc-
trine that has fallen out of favor with the Supreme Court in recent years.307
The Court’s opinion in AEP is also striking for its indifference to leg-
islative history, especially in light of the attention paid to such history by
the Milwaukee II Court.308 There were no dissenting Justices in AEP, which
supports one scholar’s contention that, while legislative history is alive and
well at the Supreme Court, the Justices tend to appeal to it only in close,
difficult cases, when other interpretive approaches are inadequate.309
concurring) (citations omitted). The Court has also made clear that the political question
doctrine is grounded in the Constitution’s limitation of federal court jurisdiction to cases
and controversies, and that this requirement does not extend to state courts. Doremus
v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (noting that the cases and controversies re-
quirement of the Constitution does not preclude state courts from issuing purely advisory
opinions). It should be noted, however, that some states retain their own versions of the
political questions doctrine, sometimes based in state constitutional provisions. For a
survey of the various state approaches to the political question doctrine, see generally Jay
M. Zitter, Construction and Application of Political Question Doctrine by State Courts,
9 A.L.R.6th 177 (2005).
306 See supra notes 267–270 and accompanying text.
307 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535 n.6; Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 15,
at 17–22.
308 See supra notes 117–119 and accompanying text.
309 Cross, supra note 164, at 1995.
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Perhaps most surprising is the Court’s holding that the regulatory
actions taken by the EPA subsequent to the Second Circuit’s decision were
not necessary to find displacement of federal common law. Both the Second
Circuit and the Solicitor General seemed to presuppose that the issue of
displacement would turn on whether the EPA regulations enacted after
the Second Circuit’s decision would be extensive enough to constitute
preemption of federal common law in this area.310 However, the Supreme
Court made clear that the CAA was itself sufficient to displace federal com-
mon law; the EPA could, if it wished, exercise its discretion not to regu-
late greenhouse gases at all, and so long as the agency issued a reasonable
explanation of its decision, there would still be displacement of federal
common law.311
Finally, the Court explicitly left open the question of whether the
CAA preempts public nuisance claims under state law. The Act’s savings
clause suggests that such state law claims are preserved, so long as they
are based on state requirements more stringent than federal regulations.
However, even the savings clause cannot protect from preemption those
state court decisions that undermine or interfere with the federal regula-
tory scheme, and there is language in the Court’s AEP opinion suggest-
ing that the Supreme Court might find preemption of state common law
decisions, in spite of the savings clause.312
Another important limitation on state common law public nuisance
cases is the inability of states to regulate greenhouse gas emitters located
in other states.313 Moreover, even if state public nuisance cases could go
310 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 379–81 (2d Cir. 2009); Solicitor
General’s Brief, supra note 15, at 8–9, 22–32.
311 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533, 2538–39. This point takes on additional
importance in light of Republican Party opposition to the EPA’s greenhouse gas reg-
ulations. See, e.g., John M. Broder, E.P.A. Scales Back Emission Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/science/earth/24emissions.html; John M.
Broder, House Republicans Take E.P.A. Chief to Task, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, http://www
.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/science/earth/10emissions.html; Gabriel Nelson, Republican
Victories Boost Effort to Block EPA’s Climate Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), http://
www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/11/03/03greenwire-republican-victories-boost-effort-to
-block-epa-72986.html. Although one might think that repeal of EPA regulations on green-
house gas emissions would reopen the door to federal public nuisance lawsuits, the Court’s
holding that it is the CAA, and not the regulations themselves, that provides preemption
makes it clear that federal common law is preempted even if the EPA decides not to reg-
ulate greenhouse gases at all.
312 See supra notes 236–242 and accompanying text.
313 See supra notes 226–233 and accompanying text.
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forward as legitimate causes of action, there are very serious questions
whether such claims could succeed on the merits. For example, an obvious
problem for such nuisance cases, should they ever get to the stage of courts
considering the substance of the claims, is the question of how to estab-
lish causation and apportion liability from multiple causal sources.314
Some scholars friendly to the state common law approach have
suggested that causation in the area of climate change might be modeled
on approaches found in certain product liability cases, involving items
such as DES and asbestos.315 Such an approach, if successful, would
somewhat ironically vindicate Swiss Re’s prediction that climate change
legislation could be “the new asbestos.”316
314 See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 30, at 22–33.
315 Id. at 22–24.
316 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
